Which social norm do you support
The effect of social norms in Germany on the decision about participation in military missions abroad
Table of Contents
2. Social constructivist foreign policy theory
2.1. Social norms as an explanatory variable
2.2. Socialization - internalizing social norms
2.3. Identification of social norms for Germany's military operations
3. Research design
4. Data collection
4.1.1. Key data on the Libya war
4.1.2. Debates in the Bundestag about Germany's military participation
4.2.1. Key data on the Syria conflict
4.2.2. Debates in the Bundestag about Germany's military participation
5. Data evaluation
7. List of sources and references
List of abbreviations
Figure not included in this excerpt
On December fourth of last year, at the request of the federal government, the Bundestag decided that the Bundeswehr should intervene in the war against IS in Syria. This step was not taken for a long time, although the NATO ally USA, for example, had been flying air strikes against IS for some time (Dewitz 2015). The terrorist attacks in Paris, which were carried out by supporters of IS and whereupon President Hollande asked for support, referring to Article 42 (7) of the Lisbon Treaty (Hanke 2015), happened in advance. However, IS had carried out terrorist attacks before, the attackers in Paris came mainly from France and Belgium and not from Syria (Hengst / Salloum 2015), and it was by no means Germany's duty to participate militarily abroad in order to meet the requirements of Art. 42 (7) to be satisfied (Badische Zeitung 2015; EU 2010). The military participation is therefore presumably due to Germany's desire to assist France in this way. In contrast to the Syria case, Germany refrained from participating in the war in Libya in 2011 and thus caused a stir in the public and among scientists (Stahl 2011: 1, 25; Hellmann 2011: 19).
Even before that, Germany's decisions regarding military missions abroad were of different kinds: Stephan Bierling identified three "phases" of military missions: In the first phase from 1991 to 1994, Germany approached "out-of-area" missions.1 The next phase was that of "assuming responsibility". It began with the participation in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1995 and had high points with the missions in Kosovo in 1999 and in Afghanistan in 2002. After that, Germany again behaved rather cautiously, which was particularly evident in the abstention from UN resolution 1973 on Libya. During the entire time Germany did not pursue any power or real politics,2 Instead, it saw military missions abroad as a burden that could only be considered as an ultima ratio (Bierling 2014: 266-267). In his article "German Foreign Policy: Orientierungslos", Hanns Maull assumed such a lack of orientation and came to the conclusion that Germany only pursues domestic interests in foreign policy. A fundamental foreign policy discussion should be held as soon as possible (Maull 2011). Now - after a long hesitation - the participation in Syria against the IS. The changeable participation of Germany in military missions abroad is therefore a mystery. In any case, military missions by democratic states require a special explanation. The double finding on democratic peace is well known: democracies3 do not attack other democracies, but this does not apply to non-democracies (Geis et al. 2010: 171). Dieterich et al. (2009) examined this second part in more detail using the Iraq war and came to the conclusion that there are significant differences in their inclination to war within the democracies: They were able to confirm their hypothesis that there is a “parliamentary-democratic peace” due to the pacifying effect of parliamentary power "(Dieterich et al. 2009: 34). Since Germany has such a parliamentary system of government and the Bundestag has to approve foreign deployments of the Bundeswehr in principle, Germany's participation in the war is all the more in need of explanation. Furthermore, it is repeatedly stated that the Bundeswehr is not well equipped, be it financially, materially or personally (Pillath 2009: 8; Deutscher Bundestag 2016; Philippi 1997: 200). That is why the question of German participation in the war is also important for the future, after all, the scarce resources must be used wisely.
Social norms could play an important role in explaining this puzzle. This is because social norms determine which action is considered appropriate and expected in a certain situation (Boekle et al. 2001: 106). The research question is therefore: How do social norms in Germany affect the decision to participate in military missions abroad? The work is intended to make a contribution on the one hand to explaining Germany's military missions abroad and on the other hand to the influence of social norms on foreign policy decisions.
Socially, this question is undoubtedly relevant, which stems from the tremendous importance of the decision about war and peace. Hardly any other decision is as far-reaching as there is, in addition to the immense financial costs for the lives of the soldiers deployed, a risk that is more or less indeterminate, but certainly an existing one. The scientific relevance results from the state of research. With the reasons for military operations by Germany and democracies in general and also with the influence of social norms and political culture in particular4 A number of researchers have dealt with such decisions. As becomes clear in the following research overview, however, the weaknesses of the theory or the concept used came to light in some analyzes. Other works could shine with great explanatory power; however, the underlying cases of military (non) deployments often date back many years. This results in a research gap that the present work is intended to close.
Rainer Baumann has a social constructivist foreign policy theory by Boekle et al. (2001), which presented social norms as explanatory variables of foreign policy, and specifically examined their explanatory power for German “out of area” missions. The cases examined were the (non-) deployments in Yugoslavia 1992-1995, Bosnia 1995-1996 (IFOR) and since 1996 (SFOR), Iraq 1998, Kosovo 1998-1999 and since 1999 (KFOR). Baumann came to the conclusion that social constructivism has great potential for explanations (Baumann 2001: 181). According to the theory, Germany would then take part in foreign missions together with NATO countries if there is legitimation under international law and the mission is to ensure peace (Baumann 2001: 168). The theory could explain more than the foreign policy theories derived from neorealism and liberalism. Foreign policy theories were also derived from these major theories, which Baumann tested in relation to German missions abroad. According to neorealism, states are primarily interested in their own security. Military action is only expected if Germany's security is affected and its own troops remain under German command (Baumann 2001: 161). However, this hypothesis could largely not be confirmed. For example, Germany would not have been involved in Bosnia since 1996 (Baumann 2001: 177). However, the variant of realism known as “modified neorealism” (post-classical realism) performed better, even better, than the constructivist theory of foreign policy. In contrast to the neorealist foreign policy theory, it is possible for Germany to entrust its own units to foreign supreme command due to the lower security risk in NATO (Baumann 2001: 162). According to a liberal foreign policy theory, Germany should only participate militarily if it appears useful domestically. In view of the financial costs, the danger for the soldiers and for the re-election of the politicians, however, this is not to be expected (Baumann 2001: 163-164). The explanatory power of this approach was therefore also very poor (Baumann 2001: 177). However, the crucial social norms to which Baumann referred in the test of social constructivism were limited to international law and peacekeeping. In the present work, however, further norms can be identified that can explain German missions abroad or their absence. In addition, the investigated (non) deployments were a few years ago. An investigation of recent cases is therefore entirely appropriate.
Geis et al. have examined the arguments used by parliamentarians in democracies to justify or reject war operations (Geis et al. 2010). For this purpose - also on the basis of a social constructivist analysis perspective - parliamentary debates of various “Western” democracies were held5 with regard to the Gulf War of 1991, the deployment in Kosovo in 1999 and the Iraq War in 2003 by means of a content analysis, whereby the categories to which the arguments were assigned were developed from various IB theories and after pre-tests (PRIF 2010: 4). In Germany reference was made more often than average to international law, but also to Germany's “role” and alliances, but less often to Germany's power (Geis et al. 2010: 193). This finding supports the assumption that social norms play a major role in the decision for or against military operations. In 2013 the article “Burdens of the past, shadows of the future” by Anna Geis was published, which explicitly dealt with the German (non) missions in the Gulf War, the Kosovo War and the Iraq War. For this purpose, the results of 2010 were used, but opinion polls and a qualitative study of German quality press (SZ and FAZ) also became part of the analysis, which referred to Germany's role as a civil power in foreign policy (Geis 2013). The mentioned concept of civil power was mainly developed by Hanns Maull with a view to the foreign policy of Germany and Japan (inter alia Kirste / Maull 1996; Maull 2007) and can also be located in social constructivism (Harnisch 1997: 24). According to role theory, every state plays a “role” in foreign policy (Kirste / Maull 1996: 290-295). “Civil Power” is one of them. Ideally, civil powers are characterized by their willingness to shape their foreign policy. At the national level, in addition to security, they want above all prosperity, democratic stability and social justice. They try to transfer this to international relations. In doing so, they are also pursuing the civilization of international politics.6 To this end, universal values are to be enforced and national sovereignty is to be partially given to the international community. Standards are recognized. Civil powers also pursue their own interests. However, since these only result from higher-level norms and values, there is no contradiction here. The national interests of the civil powers are linked to the interests of other states. These interests also include universal values such as human rights and sustainable development. Military violence is not excluded to enforce these values, but it is viewed as problematic and needs legitimation (Kirste / Maull 1996: 300-303). The European Union, of which Germany is a member, can also be viewed as a civil power (Algieri 2010: 133-134). In 1997, Nina Philippi created a catalog of conditions that must be met for Germany to participate militarily abroad. She identified no fewer than twelve conditions derived from the concept of civil power. These include, for example, international law admissibility, the approval of the Bundestag, the prior exhaustion of civil conflict resolution mechanisms, the proportionality of the use of military resources, domestic political support and the sufficient availability of financial and material resources (Philippi 1997; 2001). Sandra Pillath took up the role concept and Philippi's conditions in 2009 and tried to explain the German operations in the Congo and Lebanon. Ultimately, however, it was not able to clearly state whether all twelve conditions were met or not (Pillath 2009: 86-89). As early as 1996, Kirste and Maull admitted, among other things, that the role concepts are complex and deviant behavior is possible (Kirste / Maull 1996: 296). In addition, it is also questioned whether the portrayal of Germany as a civil power, which is fundamentally different from other western states, is at all appropriate (Baumann / Hellmann 2001: 79). On the other hand, the question of whether Germany was still a civil power because of its mission in Kosovo in 1999 without a UN mandate was repeatedly answered in the affirmative (Maull 2000; Harnisch 2001; Hyde-Price 2001).
Gunther Hellmann dedicated a chapter of his textbook on German foreign policy to the question of whether and to what extent political culture can explain German missions abroad (Hellmann 2006). The principles of “multilateralism” and “anti-militarism”, anchored in Germany since World War II, have some explanatory power, but do not seem to be suitable for explaining individual cases, but rather the general military reluctance that is widespread in Germany. Since culture cannot be changed, but changes take place only slowly, it is better to explain different foreign policies of different states than different decisions of one state (Hellmann 2006: 203). In contrast, social norms are characterized by their behavioral orientation (Brummer / Oppermann 2013: 56), which is why research into their influence can be considered relevant to explaining German missions abroad. The foreign policy theory of Boekle et al., From which the assumptions about the causal effect of social norms on foreign policy and the hypotheses about German military operations “out of area” are derived in this work, belongs to the integrative approaches, as does the role theory the transnational level and the domestic level are combined in the investigation (Peters 2007: 830-831).
Other researchers also developed an integrative approach to explain military operations by democracies. The most recent of these works is “Democratic Participation in Armed Conflict” by Patrick Mello (2014), who tried to explain the war participation of several democracies in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq with the help of a macro-qualitative analysis. Its explanatory variables were military strength, parliamentary veto rights, constitutional restrictions, public support and the political orientation of the government. The decisive factor for participating in the war was therefore a combination of domestic and external constraints. He rejected the thesis of parliamentary peace, at least for the Iraq war and the Kosovo war; In the case of Afghanistan, no statement could be made on this (Mello 2014: 97, 134, 178). The integrative decision-making model that David Auerswald developed for the positions of NATO countries is ten years older7 to explain in the Kosovo conflict. He also linked the domestic with the international level. At the domestic political level, among other things, the structure of the government was decisive; a government that was weak in terms of its institutional structure would inevitably lead to poor support for a military operation (Auerswald 2004: 643). Whether the resulting hypothesis for Auerswald that Germany would generally be reluctant, if at all, to speak out in favor of a military operation, can certainly be doubted with a view to Afghanistan or the EU operation ATALANTA.
David Welch also developed a theory that combined several concepts in his book "Painful Choices". He wanted to explain major changes in the foreign policy of a state, which he expressly included the change from a state of peace to a state of war (Welch 2005: 58). He combined assumptions from organizational theory, cognitive psychology and prospect theory into three hypotheses that should explain foreign policy change of course. As a result, states change their foreign policy fundamentally if the previous policy fails repeatedly or catastrophically. Decision-makers should be more willing to take risks when they are in the loss and not in the profit area. In addition, changes in direction in foreign policy are more frequent in autocracies and less bureaucratized states than in democratic and highly bureaucratized states due to the functional logic of the systems. However, policy changes that are a mere reaction to changed behavior in other countries are not covered by this theory (Welch 2005: 45-46).
The prospect theory was also the focus of Klaus Brummer's essay "Germany’s participation in the Kosovo was: Bringing agency back in". A study on Germany's participation in the war is thus also available, which focuses on foreign policy decision-makers and thus on individuals as actors.Brummer tested the explanatory power of Prospect Theory and Analogical Reasoning as one representative of cognitive and psychological approaches. According to his investigation, the Prospect Theory in particular explained the German mission in Kosovo very well. If the decision-makers are dissatisfied with the status quo and do not expect any improvement and are therefore in the so-called loss area, more risk-taking decisions - and a war effort is usually part of it - are more likely to compensate for the perceived loss (Brummer 2012). In addition to the integrative approaches and work presented, which start from the systemic level, as in Hellmann's 2006 article, there is also a research strand that focuses on individuals as actors. The disadvantage, however, is that the institutional and structural constraints in which the decision-makers find themselves are largely ignored. One of the criticisms of the Prospect Theory is that it is unclear what the reference point of an actor is. This is important for determining the profit or loss range (Brummer / Oppermann: 146-147). Despite the diversity of research on the topic of German or democratic military operations, further research is necessary in this area, as already mentioned, because either the explanatory power is inadequate or the cases examined date back some time.
In this thesis, the impact of social norms on the decision about Germany's military missions abroad is to be examined. Boekle et al. according to advantages over other ideal variables. On the one hand, social norms are directly behavior-oriented, which distinguishes them from ideas, culture, world views and identity (Boekle et al. 2001: 107). For Alexander Wendt, too, norms have an influence on concrete behavior: “Norms are causal insofar as they regulate behavior.” (Wendt 1999: 82) Culture, identity and world views are too abstract concepts to suggest a certain behavior. Ideas, on the other hand, do not have the intersubjectivity inherent in social norms. Ideas have a subjective character, i.e. they express the beliefs of individuals, while norms are "building blocks of social structures" (Brummer / Oppermann 2013: 56). In addition, standards have the advantage of counterfactual validity. This means that isolated violations do not make the norm invalid (ibid.).
In the next chapter the foreign policy theory of Boekle et al. (2001), since in their theory social norms represent the decisive independent variable that is supposed to explain Germany's foreign policy and thus also its decisions about war participation. That is why the hypotheses about the effect of social norms with regard to the decision about German military operations abroad are also generated from this theory. The theory can handle the actor-structure problem8 largely to be dismantled, since structures as “mediators” of the applicable norms are important, but these have to be accepted and transported by actors in order to gain validity and can also be changed by them.9 Special attention is paid to socialization, through which the social norms are internalized.
On the basis of the theory, the social norms that are decisive for Germany's foreign missions are derived and the hypotheses are drawn up. In the third chapter the methodological approach is examined. The choice of the content analysis of Bundestag debates on Germany's possible war missions as a suitable method of investigation is justified. Libya 2011, where Germany did not participate militarily, and the decision about an operation in Syria, which was made in 2015, are the investigation cases, the selection of which is also explained in the third chapter. The data are then collected in Chapter 4 and evaluated in Chapter 5, before the procedure and results of the work are summarized in the final part and the
Research question is answered, but weaknesses of the work are also addressed. The study shows that there was no military involvement in Libya mainly because it was doubted that the operation could bring about peace. For Syria, this was accepted by a majority despite the confusing situation in the country, but the request for help from France probably also played a key role.
First, however, the theory of the impact of social norms on foreign policy decisions is explained.
2.1. Social norms as an explanatory variable
In this chapter, on the basis of the social constructivist foreign policy theory of Boekle et al. the hypotheses about the influence of social norms on Germany's decisions for or against military participation abroad are developed, which are tested in Chapter 4. Social norms are defined as value-based expectations of appropriate behavior that are shared by many people, i.e. apply intersubjectively (Boekle et al. 2001: 106). What all constructivist approaches have in common is that they differ from rationalist theories such as realism and liberalism in that the actors - be they states, organizations or persons - are viewed as appropriate and not as acting rationally (Ulbert 2005: 9; Schimmelfennig 2013). This means that constructivist theories are also based on a different image of man; the homo oeconomicus perceived by rationalist theories is criticized by social constructivists; instead, the human being is a homo sociologicus or a role player. Decisions are made on the basis of norms and rules against the background of subjective factors and historical-cultural experiences (Boekle et al. 2001: 106). The norms of both the international system and the society of a state can influence foreign policy behavior. From a social constructivist perspective, norms, but also values and ideas, do not serve as instruments to justify certain interests, but are expressly guiding principles (Boekle et al. 2001: 105-106). They have a constitutive effect, i.e. only the norms ensure that certain goals and interests are expressed (Boekle et al. 2001: 107). This is another difference from rationalist theories; There the norms serve the interests, in social constructivism they precede the interests. So that does not mean that interests are meaningless in constructivism. They are important, but it must first be clarified what interests are and how they are pursued (Finnemore 1996a: 157).
The more widespread they are in a social system and the better they provide information about appropriate and inappropriate behavior, the stronger the assessment of the power of social norms (Boekle et al. 2001: 105). Norms should only be able to influence behavior if they are shared by a certain number of people in a social system. How big this number has to be is not certain; however, the relevant social norms should at least apply to a large majority of people (Boekle et al. 2001: 109). However, the importance of social norms also increases with increasing specificity. The more clearly they are expressed, the stronger they appear. Therefore, standards that are described in laws or international conventions are particularly effective (Boekle et al. 2001: 109-110). National and international law, the results of international conferences and legal acts by international organizations are accordingly among the most important indicators for social norms (Boekle et al. 2001: 124-129). Only these should play a role in this work, since unspecific norms do not specify exactly which behavior is appropriate or at least there is a greater scope for appropriate behavior (Boekle et al. 2001: 110). This would undermine the action-guiding character of the norms.
2.2. Socialization - internalizing social norms
Norms must first be internalized in order to apply as such. Social norms are internalized through socialization (Boekle et al. 2001: 110). Socialization is therefore the causal mechanism through which social norms influence foreign policy decisions. Albert Scherr defines socialization as "the process in which a person grows into the surrounding social contexts, acquires the language (s), habits, rules and norms given there and at the same time becomes an individual capable of acting independently and stubbornly." (Scherr 2016: 306) Social norms are internalized through what is known as secondary socialization (ibid.). In the course of this, a person also learns to distinguish appropriate from inappropriate behavior. Due to ever new situations and decisions, socialization is never completed, but happens continuously, whereby people can also reflect on this process (Boekle et al. 2001: 110) and therefore attitudes are also consolidated or changed (Scherr 2016: 306). Political socialization includes all processes that shape a person's political attitudes, mediated primarily by parents, school, their peers and the mass media (Patzelt 2013: 358-359). However, one should be careful not to understand socialization only in such a way that individuals are passive and are exclusively shaped by society. In addition to the aforementioned reflection on their own socialization, the individual is also actively involved insofar as he also socializes himself, e.g. by learning to see himself from the perspective of other people and dealing with requirements and expectations (Scherr 2016: 307- 308).
The peculiarity of foreign policy is that decision-makers are simultaneously exposed to influences from both the international and domestic communities, as they operate at the interface between the two. There are therefore two types of socialization processes: transnational socialization, during which international norms are internalized, and social socialization, in which social norms, i.e. the norms shared by “own” citizens, are internalized (Boekle et al. 2001: 110 -111). While transnational constructivism and social constructivism see either international or social norms as independent variables for foreign policy, both levels are connected in this work, since the separation is theoretically artificial anyway (Boekle et al. 2001: 106); the transitions are fluid (Hellmann 2006: 99).
International organizations play an important role in transnational socialization, as they express the communities of values of states. They are “the most important socializing agents.” (Boekle et al. 2001: 111) International norms find their way into international organizations; they define collective goals and appropriate behaviors to pursue those goals. Since they are part of the international community, states also have an impact on international socialization themselves. If states feel they are part of such a community of values, they will see the organization's guidelines as appropriate and act accordingly in order to remain a respected part of this community (Boekle et al. 2001: 111-112). In addition to international organizations, international regimes are also important for internalizing norms. They are "sets of principles, norms, rules and decision-making processes [...]" (Boekle et al. 2001: 120, own translation, own emphasis) that provide information about behavioral expectations.
How exactly the internalization of international norms takes place is controversial. This work follows an understanding that internalization is understood as the “institutionalization of norms in the national legal systems” (Risse 2003: 119). As a result, the international norms to which Germany is committed should be reflected in the German legal system.
For some researchers of social constructivism, political culture and national identity are crucial. Both are characterized by their stability and wide spread in society and include ideas, values and norms, among other things. In the context of this work, however, social norms are preferred as independent variables, on the one hand in order to be able to combine transnational and social constructivism, and on the other hand because norms - as mentioned above - are behavior-oriented (Boekle et al. 2001: 121-122). The term “culture”, on the other hand, would have to be split up anyway in order to become the subject of empirical research, since it can mean many things and can therefore neither be clearly defined nor operationalized (Jetschke / Liese 1998: 151). Culture can include “everything that arises through human activity and therefore contains meanings” (Tenbruck 1990: 27). However, norms can be understood as a more or less large part of culture and also determine the identity of people (Jetschke / Liese 1998: 151, 155-156). In this respect, culture, identity and social norms are linked. It is therefore not surprising that political culture and national identity can serve as indicators for social norms (Boekle et al. 2001: 122-123).
Socialization is primarily characterized by the influence of society as a whole, but also by the influence of individual groups. This influence is exerted on foreign policy-makers in three ways: through the political socialization that they experience during their lives like all other citizens; from previous political careers during which they internalized even higher expectations of appropriate behavior; and through its function as a representative of society towards its international environment. The government would risk recognition in society and thus also its chances of re-election if it did not act in accordance with the social expectations of society (Boekle et al. 2001: 112-113). Foreign policy is therefore also determined by expectations of domestic behavior. One can assume that decision-makers want the international environment to be organized according to the same values as their own country (Boekle et al. 2001: 123). That is why the actions of the Federal Government should also be an expression of the social norms applicable in Germany. However, the federal government should also always endeavor to act in accordance with the expectations of international organizations to which Germany belongs. Ultimately, from a constructivist point of view, it is in the interest of every state to be perceived as a legitimate member of the organizations and thus of the corresponding communities of values (Boekle et al. 2001: 112). An explanation of foreign policy behavior would be impossible if domestic and international norms contradict each other, since it has not yet been possible to clarify which social norms have a stronger influence on decision-makers in foreign policy. However, if the social norms of both levels match, the constructivist explanation would have to be particularly strong (Boekle et al. 2001: 113-114). In relation to Germany's decisions on military operations abroad, this means that a clear answer to the research question is only possible if Germany's social norms and the norms of the organizations and regimes to which Germany belongs and which are of particular importance for Germany's military operations - UNO, NATO and the EU with their respective sets of rules - at least not contradicting them.
2.3. Identification of social norms for Germany's military operations
There are a number of indicators for identifying the social norms applicable in Germany that deal with military operations. For international standards, this includes general international law, legal acts of international organizations and the final acts of international conferences. Because international law expresses the social and political values of a community. The fact that states tend to adhere to the requirements of international law rather than violate them can be attributed to the logic of appropriateness (Boekle et al. 2001: 124). International law reflects the applicable international norms, or, to put it in Martha Finnemore's words: “At the international level norms are the law.” (Finnemore 1996b: 139, emphasis in the original) International organizations express their expectations of appropriate behavior members through legal acts such as resolutions. However, their cohesiveness is different. For example, UN resolutions are not of a binding nature, but rather resemble recommendations. EU regulations, on the other hand, are binding on all EU members. Since constructivism assumes that the organizations are communities of values whose requirements the states want to meet, this distinction should not play a role. At international conferences, on the other hand, common objectives often emerge which, although they have no legal character, should not be disregarded either (Boekle et al. 2001: 126-127). The legal system is also of paramount importance for domestic norms, as social norms manifest themselves there sooner or later, but party programs and opinion polls can also provide information about applicable norms.Opinion polls are only useful if the interviewee is sufficiently familiar with the topic, measurement errors can be minimized and carried out over a longer period of time, since otherwise it is not social norms but only fleeting opinions that are measured. As a rule, however, these conditions are not fully met, which is why opinion polls are not considered in this work (Boekle et al. 2001: 128-132).
In Germany, the norms regarding foreign military operations have visibly changed after the fall of the Wall. This applies to both international and social norms. For the international norms to which the German foreign policy decision-makers are subject, NATO is decisive in the military field (Baumann 2001: 145), since it is regarded as the "military arm of the western community of values" (Hellmann 2006: 103). NATO sees itself as a “community of freedom, peace, security and common values” (NATO 2010). She has declared that, among other things, human rights, the rule of law and democracy are among these common values (ibid.). She also expects the members to cooperate with her (Baumann 2001: 145). It is therefore expected that Germany as a member of the alliance will take part in “out of area” operations, provided there is a solid legal basis (Baumann 2001: 164). According to Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, one of the basic principles is the duty to provide assistance if a member has been attacked. In addition, NATO is committed to the United Nations Charter and recognizes the EU as an important partner. Furthermore, it is made clear that conflicts outside of one's own territory can also pose a threat, which must therefore be prevented or managed (NATO 2010). During the East-West conflict, it was not even expected that NATO missions would be “out of area”, ie missions outside the territory of the contracting states. But that changed after the end of the Cold War. The calls for peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations under Chapter VII of the UN Charter became louder. Because of increasing conflicts within states, regional organizations have become more important. Therefore, in 1992 it declared its readiness to NATO to carry out operations under the auspices of the then CSCE. In 1994 it was declared that operations would also be carried out under a UN mandate that were outside of its own territory. In 1999, crisis management was laid down as a task in the Strategic Concept of NATO (Baumann 2001: 164-166).
1 “Out-of-area” missions are military missions abroad that take place outside the territory of the NATO states. In this work, “foreign deployments” and “military deployments” always mean military deployments “out of area”.
2 This is made clear, among other things, by Germany's refusal to seek nuclear weapons after reunification (Kirste / Maull 1996: 305), and by the lack of participation in the war in Libya, where a state pursuing its own interests could have tried to exert influence after Gaddafi's fall to obtain the sale of the huge Libyan oil reserves (Wagner 2013: 118).
3 Democracy is used here instead of the more precise but less legible term (liberal) democratic constitutional state, but it means precisely this.
4 Social norms can be seen as part of political culture. Culture is a very comprehensive term that can hardly be operationalized (Jetschke / Liese 1998: 151, 155).
5 These were: France, United Kingdom, Canada, Sweden, Germany, USA and Australia. 4th
6 This means that violence as a means of resolving conflicts between people is increasingly rejected and even embarrassing, which is carried over to international politics because of the increasing density of interaction between states (Kirste / Maull 1996: 297-298).
7 Auerswald referred to France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America.
8 Social phenomena are usually explained taking into account the structures that embed actions or taking into account the actors. The problem with this is that both ways cannot adequately explain international politics. The reason for this is the assumption of structures or actors as given and thus an overall excessively great reduction in social reality (Ulbert 2005: 17).
9 See Chapter 2.
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