When was the first human soul



Question: Where is the will in the brain?
Leibovitz: "The will is not in the brain, but in the owner of the brain. The brain is just a mechanism."
Interview with Y. Leibovitz (broadcast by Hessischer Fernsehen on March 9, 1996)

In order to really do justice to my cause, I would have to show in this lecture that Wittgenstein is no solipsist, no mentalist, no pragmatist, no gestalt psychologist, no empiricist and of course no cognitivist at all. I can't afford all of that. Instead, I can only put forward the hypothesis that Wittgenstein, also the "Philosophy of Psychology", developed new ideas in which, e.g. For example, the question would be to what extent it anticipated Radical Constructivism decades before its emergence - and overtook it, overtook it, because Radical Constructivism only wants to be a naturalized epistemology and is not a philosophy.

My thesis is: It is about a philosophy of the interplay of perception, language game and "soul" / subjectivity, both as a whole and also with regard to the "philosophy of psychology".
Due to the (in my opinion substantially Marxist) radical intersubjectivity of the language game, the so-called subjective-psychic is not thematic at all, without but, and that is the key point, to be denied or repressed. As an alternative, until further clarification, I propose to start from a self-givenness of the soul in Wittgenstein, entirely in the sense of his vision of a reflected immediacy freed from philosophical brain cramps, the goal / fulfillment of which is "peace in thoughts" (VB: 91) .
What I can offer is just a "reading", a circling around the mentioned objects of perception, language games and the soul in the hope that some contradictions will eventually resolve themselves.


The term "antipsychology" in the subtitle of my lecture is meant ambiguously:
1. Wittgenstein argued against the psychological directions of his time (the idealistic psychology of inwardness, the empirical realism of a Russell and behaviorism), which I cannot address here.
2. I use the term somewhat diffusely in the sense of antipsychologistic.
3. I wanted to signal positively with the term that Wittgenstein was about philosophy, not about developing your own psychology. Already in the Tractatus it says: "Epistemology is the philosophy of psychology." (T 4.1121)
The late Wittgenstein (between 1946 and 1949) criticized the Gestalt psychology of W. Köhler with the expression "confusion and desolation of psychology" (PU: 580). He cites the "experimental method" as the reason and conceptual confusion"(ib.).
As Wittgenstein briefly suggests, the two reasons are internally related: it is the experimental method that leads us to believe that "we have the means to get rid of the problems that worry us; although problem and method run crookedly by." (ib.)
This state, I would say, has reached its climax today with the increasingly abstract - and then reified - "model" formations of so-called cognitive psychology.

I assume that everything that Wittgenstein reflected on psychological questions is in the service of his language game philosophy, which turns out to be an increasingly gigantic building.


The first sentence of the Tractatus is known to be: "The world is everything that is the case." (T 1)
Even if you - like me - this sentence Not understands ontologically and has learned that in the end it will be taken ad absurdum (because it is a philosophical proposition and therefore nonsensical), for the question of the subject or I it means: The subject, the I, also belongs to that which is the case is, it is a "fact", not a "thing" (T 1.1).
On the first pages of the Tractatus the subject is in no way problematized, in the argumentation "I" and "we" alternate unpretentiously, just one example:
"If I know the object, I also know all the possibilities of its occurrence in facts." (T 2.0123)
Perhaps this harmless alternation of I and we is the reason why the performers do the importance of the "we" overlooked in the first sentence of image theory. Theorem 2.1. reads: "We make pictures of the facts."
As inconspicuous as this "we" is, it is still a collective we, and one interprets the sentence correctly when one says, for example: We, all human beings, have to make images of reality for ourselves, "models" (2.12) for world orientation.
In so far and because the image theory of the Tractatus is an epistemology, Wittgenstein's (already quoted) sentence M 4.1121 must apply to it: "Epistemology is the philosophy of psychology." However, the sentence immediately before it reads: "Psychology is no more related to philosophy than any other natural science."
Does Wittgenstein conduct a kind of metapsychology, I ask?

In the context of "certain sentence forms in psychology" (5.541), Wittgenstein says "that the soul - the subject, etc. - as it is understood in today's superficial psychology, is absurd.
A composite soul would no longer be a soul. "(5.5421)
(I cannot go into further detail here that this passage already means a criticism of the subject-object model.)

Right away in front this passage says:
"What is solipsism? means, is quite correct, only it cannot be done saybut it shows itself. "(5.62)
So you can speak philosophically of the I, of the subject, but you cannot develop a theory about it. However, the perhaps annoying problem remains to what extent "the subject" can be "a boundary of the world", that is to say "my" world, if not - non-image - a simple cessation [1].

In the next sentence Wittgenstein asks "Where in the world can a metaphysical subject be noted?" (5,633)
And there follows an analogy with physical perception, with the eye being the analogue of the subject. Wittgenstein shows, with a negative graphic image, so to speak, that the eye is not a fixed quantity opposite the field of vision. The comparison of the subject with the eye is wrong: "You really see the eye Not.
And nothing on the field of vision suggests that it is seen by one eye. "(5.633)
(I will come to the connection, more precisely the non-connection, of the visual field and the subject of perception later.)

The comparison shows, in my opinion, that neither the subject nor the eye should be understood epistemologically as "objects".
Immediately following Wittgenstein asserts (in 5.64) that solipsism falls "strictly carried out, coincides with pure realism". "The ego of solipsism shrinks to an expansionless point, and it remains the coordinated reality."
A sentence from the diaries (dated November 9, 1916) agrees well with this: "All experience is world and does not need the subject."
In the Tractatus the following sentences follow:

I leave the idea that the concept of the "metaphysical subject" is still or again ontology to the academic philosophers, I consider it wrong in view of Wittgenstein's overall anti-metaphysical thinking [2].

The fact that Wittgenstein does not hallucinate a "metaphysical subject" in the traditional sense is shown in my opinion even in the Tractatus (also) by the fact that there is no mention of the I or the subject itself in the context of the "mystical", the core sentence is:
"The view of the world sub specie aeterni is its view as a - limited - whole. The feeling of the world as a limited whole is the mystical." (6.45)
Here, one would like to say, Wittgenstein knows no problematic of a subjectivity (or fashionably: an "essence").
That my interpretation is correct is shown by the following two remarks (only from 1931): "Solipsism could be refuted by the fact that the word 'I' does not have a central position in grammar, but is a word like any other word." And straight on:

My thesis as a whole is: Here too, despite all the corrections, the substantive one applies unit of Wittgenstein's work - through interpretation.

Face space

On February 2, 1929, Wittgenstein began his philosophical work in Cambridge with reflections on visual space and thus on a theory of perception. As in the Tractatus, he starts out from the metaphor of the logical "space" because he is not interested in either a physical or a physiological theory of perception, but rather a LOGIC of perception.

Wittgenstein separates the visual space from Euclidean space, which, because it is a logical construction, cannot be "the object of my perception" (WA 2: 94, 98.).
The decisive determinations of the facial space are:
"The visual space as it is [sic] has its own independent reality.
It does not contain a subject. He is autonomous. //
He can be described directly ... "(WA 2: 3)

The space of "our ordinary language" is "the combined visual, tactile and muscular feeling space [sic] that is why I can 'turn around' in this space and see 'what's going on behind me' etc." (WA 2: 4)

That is why the expression "facial" space is crooked; one should actually speak of perceptual space. It follows that all Sensory perceptions, including the so-called psychological ones, are to be included and taken into account (cf. WA 2: 4).
"In the facial space there is nothing that is essentially subject. And also nothing in my toothache that could be called the owner of this pain." (WA 3: 143)
"The face space has essentially no owner." (2: 100)

So the facial space is not simply subjective space. Even if, Wittgenstein continues, I always saw my nose and everyone else too his Nose, if the facial space were not "subjective" (ib.):

"The essential thing is that the representation of the visual space represents an object and does not contain any suggestion of a subject." (2: 100)
"The difficulty that makes us speaking about the visual space without a subject and about my and his toothache is to adjust the language so that it sits correctly in the facts." (WA 4: 188)

Wittgenstein - as much as he is a logician - does not accept the physiological objection that it is the "retina" that has an up and down, right and left, the explanation of the retina is for Wittgenstein a "detour", it just is a (possible) "representation of the [for Wittgenstein logical] Facts "(WA 1:11)

Facial image

Perhaps it is no longer astonishing that Wittgenstein's specific conception of visual space follows: that too Face image is not absolutely mine, not a "sensory date" that I and only I can have. It is true, says Wittgenstein, that "it seems to be a fact of experience that at the origin of the Field of view mostly a short man with gray flannel trousers is located, namely LW "(VE: 74). But: The seen object" is only inadequately described with the words "what I see" or "my facial image" because it has with a certain person he has nothing to do with it. Instead, I would like to call it 'what has been seen'. "(VE: 89)
For Wittgenstein, the facial image is "what is seen", a form, a kind of nameless, pre-linguistic concept.
Rising from the passive state of seeing, I begin to act by perceiving forms.
For Wittgenstein there is basically no direct relationship between the perceiver and the perceived object, no one-to-one relationship between the physical world and the facial images of it.

The facial image is not an object, because: "One cannot look at the impression, therefore it is not an object. (Grammatically.)" (7: 195)
Wittgenstein recalls "the conceptual difference between sensory impression and object" (7: 196)

For the perceiver, physical reality appears in the sensual concept that he receives from it.
We do not perceive the things themselves, the objects themselves, the perception does not incorporate the object world directly into us, but: we perceive facts, circumstances, things-for-us: what we see, hear, feel is not the object itself but a "picture" of him. When smelling z. B. this is the clearest: I say: "It smells to Lavender "or" I smell lavender ".
The trans-subjective concept of what is seen (vs. 'my face image', VE: 89) ensures that the logic of perception is fundamentally socially shared, communal.

The abolition of the subject-object model of perception seems clear to me with Wittgenstein: Here, perception can no longer be a simple representation of reality; but whether it is to be understood as a constructive process - as in radical constructivism - is the question.

The fundamental difficulty with Wittgenstein's concept of the facial image is (now) firstly that Wittgenstein (almost) never forgets that all his remarks on seeing are only the modal example for all other forms of perception at the same time (as I wanted to suggest with the lavender example) .
Second, and this is where the trickiest problem of the whole and also of the whole of Wittgenstein's conception of the psychic lies: the concept of image was indeed not a mimetic concept of image in the Tractatus (for example in the sense of a reflection theory), but this also applies to the ( visual, and any) perception: also the facial "image", what is seen, is for Wittgenstein - not an IMAGE. You heard that right; because for Wittgenstein it is "a metaphor when you say that the senses provide us with images." (PU: 131)
The image concept is only a comparison for something that is logically and conceptually underlying, which one could call a form.
The facial image only stands in "analogy" to an "image" as a representation, a sign; but it is not a picture itself (VE: 58).

With the facial image we are given "the conceptual difference between sensory impression and object" (7: 196).
The logical conclusion to be drawn here is, in my opinion: Perception is, semiotically precisely thought, not yet a language, it does not provide any signs. (Signs and images are reversed language only as human productions in society.)

Expression, behavior, expression

In the term "expression" Wittgenstein bundles on the one hand the fundamental expressiveness of what is seen, everything perceived, the involuntary expression (e.g. the cry of pain or the delighted expression) and the arbitrary sign expression (gesture, sound, image, writing); on the other hand, linguistic expression as exclamation, message, designation, description. This complexity of the term "expression" is an essential reason for the great difficulty in understanding Wittgenstein's philosophical semiotics.

For the arbitrary as well as the involuntary expression, Wittgenstein very often uses the words "behavior" or "behavior" - entirely in the sense of his form of the philosophy of action.
This bundling of possible forms of expression, which is very difficult to think of, makes good psychological sense not to fall back into the Cartesian dichotomy of I and world, body and soul. For Wittgenstein the "emotions" and the simple sensations have a "characteristic expressive behavior" in common - despite all differences (7: 246).
Individual, isolated expressive movements are not yet signs themselves, rather only potential signs, they are ambiguous, such as the symptom of a face turning red: "The gesture tries to represent - one might say - but it cannot." (PU 434)
Only in the "language game" does a sign appear in a concise sense, the language game is an "interplay of movements [involuntary and arbitrary, C.B.], words, expressions" (Z 594).

Language game

Simple expression, "primitive behavior" (Z 545) is signed. Only in the language game does every possible form of expression become possible emblematic: The language game presupposes perception and perceived expressive movement, but only begins in the developing, coherent use of signs: in a systematization.
"The primitive reaction could be a look, a gesture, but also a word." (PU: 559)
But a scream, an exclamation, even a word is only a potential sign in isolation.
"Only in the practice of a language can a word have meaning." (6: 344)
Only from pre-linguistic behavior / behavior can language, the huge language game integral of a form of life, of a culture, have arisen.And the origin of the language game is phylogenetically "pre-individual practice" (Roberts 1992: 75).
The language games presuppose "continuity and intersubjectivity" (Roberts 1992: 72) (cf. PU 199 and 202).

For questions of the psychological as well as for psychology, in my opinion, everything psychological is anchored in Wittgenstein's language game, in the interaction of groups through which rules are first produced ("as we go along", as it is called in PU 83). Wittgenstein's multiple quotations from Goethe's "In the beginning was the deed" has both phylogenetic and philosophical significance [5].
Wittgenstein clearly emphasized the sociality of the psychic in sentences such as:
"The concept of pain is characterized by its specific function in our lives." (Z 532)
"Pain lies so in our life has such Connections. (I.e. only what so is inherent in life such Has connections, we call it 'pain'.) "(Z 533)
"Only in the midst of certain normal expressions of life there is an expression of pain. Only in the midst of much more far-reaching specific expressions of life the expression of grief or affection. U.s.f." (Z 534)

Using the example of hope, Wittgenstein makes it very clear that mental processes With the language games can only be learned. One day one can say of the child:
"'Today it said' I hope 'for the first time." (Z 469)
The development of emotional impulses is part of the development of the child.
And Wittgenstein turns sharply against the talk about an "internal process" (ib.), Not because he denied it, but because there are enough external indications for the hopeful behavior: "Life gradually becomes that in which for Hope there is room. " (Z 469)

Giegel saw correctly (as early as 1969) "that the 'direct' experience of mental events is only possible on the basis of the intersubjective experience of mental events." (Giegel 1969: 133)

Inside Outside

It should have become clear that Wittgenstein rejects an actual introspection theory without being a behaviorist.
To this end, and to show Wittgenstein's determination, I now make a few important remarks:
"Every process is in a certain sense an external process." (WA 3: 148)
The shortest formula to which Wittgenstein brought up the question of what is going on "in" someone, "in his mind", is: "The devil take what goes on in him!" (W 7: 114)
And he comments:
"The comparison of thinking with a process in secrecy is, in philosophy, misleading." (ib.)
"If everything goes as normal, nobody thinks about the internal process that accompanies the speech." (7: 368)
"If someone were to say everything 'what is inside', we should not understand him." (7: 378)

And the text before is the famous one:
"If a lion could speak, we couldn't understand him." (ib.)
Word has got around that we could not understand the speaking lion because we do not share his way of life, because he lives - entirely in the sense of the Tractatus - in another "world". Its so-called "inside" would not be the problem.
For Wittgenstein, the "security of the first person" is just as much an "apparent" one as the "uncertainty of the third" (W 7: 473). And he aims at a social condition among people, at least "among a group of people", in which a "doubt about expressions of feeling would be quite alien". (W 7: 336)
Likewise ex negativo: Even if someone "unlocks his innermost being with a confession", "cannot explain to me (that) the nature of the outside and inside, because I have to believe the confession. / The confession is something external. " (7: 335)
Wittgenstein, so to speak, softens the difference between inner and outer soul:
"'You can't look into your heart.' The question is: can he's ? (The determines the term.) "(W 7: 383)
"And if that Expression game developed, so I can of course say that a soul develops, a Interior. But now the inside is no longer the cause of the expression. "(W 7: 473)

I, soul

"The idea of ​​the I that lives in a body must be abolished." (PU: 55)
With this Wittgenstein does not want to abolish the ego, but rather the isolating, idealistic and - if necessary - positivistic conception of consciousness.
The text that follows reads: "When all consciousness is distributed over all human bodies, there will be no temptation to use the word 'I'."
Wittgenstein gives a good example of this:
"Sprachspiel: I paint - for myself - what I see. I do not appear in the picture. "(VE: 55; see T 5.631)
"'I' obviously means my body because [sic] I am in this room; and 'I' is essentially something that [sic] is in one place and in a place of the same room in which the other bodies are also. " (WA 2: 133)
And in addition:
"'Realism', 'Idealism', etc. are metaphysical names from the start. That is, they indicate that [sic] their followers believe they can say something [sic] certain about the nature of the world." (WA 2: 134)
"One of the most misleading ways of presenting our language is the use of the word 'I', especially where it represents the immediate experience as in 'I see a red spot'." (WA 2: 135)
The word "I" is explained by grammar, namely by the rules it gives for the use of the word "I". (WA 3: 75)

The personal pronoun is "not essential to the facts" (WA 2: 135). Replacing this expression with another would "clearly ... show what [sic] is the logically essential element of the representation." (ib.) (December 14, 1929)
"In ... the non-hypothetical / description of what is seen, heard - these words denote grammatical forms here - the ego does not appear, subject and object are not mentioned here." (WA 3: 151)

Before: "The subject-object form relates to the body and the things around it that affect it." (WA 3: 151)

Wittgenstein basically starts from a close connection between I-sentences and substitute-sentences.

Young children’s difficulties in learning to say I do not, of course, come from the fact that they did not start out from themselves, were not "I" -related; rather, it is related to the learning of names as learning to identify, which stands in contrast to the detachability and joker character of saying “I”. (Tugendhat [1998: 89] showed this very nicely.)

For Wittgenstein it is Not "misleading" - despite the rejection of the (psychological) talk of the "inside", "to speak of the human soul or of his spirit" (W 7: 115/586)
And he negates the opinion that everything "that can be expressed through the word 'soul'" can somehow also be expressed through words for the physical "(ib.). But, he continues, it doesn't really matter, because: "The words ... are just the instruments, and now it depends on their use." (ib.)

Wittgenstein often uses "consciousness" for "soul":

On the one hand, there is the infinite difficulty of Wittgenstein's "Philosophy of Psychology" in following his seemingly endless differentiation of what seeing, expressing, describing, etc. can be. On the other hand, it is Wittgenstein who shows himself to be an "optimist" when it comes to psychological phenomena, also with regard to the description by psychology.
Against the statement, "The human soul life cannot be described at all; it is so extremely complicated and full of barely tangible experiences. (...) Yes, just take the visual experience! Your gaze wanders almost continuously; how could you describe?" - Wittgenstein sets against this statement: "And yet I describe it!" He also does not accept that the description is only very crude: "But isn't this what I call a description of my experience? How do I come to the concept of a kind of description that I cannot possibly give?" (W 7: 194/1079)
Even more:

If you come from the physiological side - which today seems to determine everything "cognitively" - there would be primarily a ("reflecting") seeing, and only then, after that and in addition - so to speak, "psychologically" seeing the expression. (Compare 7: 193/1073)
But this is not the case for Wittgenstein; rather, his entire thought endeavors to demonstrate the interweaving of impression and expression.

It is different only on the level of the DESCRIPTION: "The description of an experience [of perception] does not describe an object. It can use the description of an object. (...) / The impression - I would like to say - is not an object. " (W 7: 195/1081)
The opposite applies: "We learn to describe objects and thereby, in a different sense, our sensations." (W 7: 195/1082)

The body as an image of the soul

In conclusion, I will try to interpret some of Wittgenstein's remarks from the so-called second part of the PU, which have only recently received closer attention (cf. V. Savigny & Scholz). Eike von Savigny sums up Wittgenstein's philosophical-psychological thought movements very well:

The key expression "attitude to the soul" is in the following context of the text: Wittgenstein imagines that he says of a friend: "He is not an automaton" and asks how this sentence could represent a "message". He concludes: "'I think that it is not an automaton' has, without further ado, no sense at all.
My attitude towards him is an attitude towards the soul. I don't have that opinionthat he has a soul. "(PU: 495)

The first sentence has no (general) sense here because it is groundless.
Our attitude towards a human being as an animated living being, and that is intuitive, is not based on questioned or questionable knowledge, but is the natural language game action. Even the sentence "I believe that he has a soul" would therefore "so easily" make no sense for Wittgenstein. I my nothing if I treat the other as an animated being, at least as long as he does not turn out to be a soulless beast.
So the "attitude to the soul" lies in front every opinion, conviction, every knowledge, even a religion. This attitude belongs to our "way of life".
On the other hand, the historically rather dominant reversal sets people Not to be treated as animated, opinion, ideology, decision, etc. ahead. (The enslavement text Z 528f would have to be interpreted here, which begins as follows: "An auxiliary construction. A tribe that we want to enslave. The government and science say that the people of this tribe have no souls, so you can go to anyone you want Use purpose ... ")

Part of the "attitude towards the soul" is to be able to recognize and interpret the involuntary as well as the voluntary expression of the other, and to be able to interpret it intuitively, if one goes into the mimic-gestural detail, so to speak (which the perception theory requires). In my opinion, the following text expresses the typical Wittgensteinian amalgamation of realistic-pragmatic description with logical-philosophical reflection:

Semiotic is to say here: Wittgenstein rejects a symptomatology in this area. According to another remark, it is "misleading" to say that the psychologist reports "the words, the behavior of the subject ... only as signs of mental processes". The perception and description (including the psychological-scientific) of psychics cannot follow the correct behavior of the doctor, who speaks "of the color of the face as a sign of fever" (7: 65/292).
In the anthology just cited, Michel ter Hark uses the term "attitude approach" to characterize Wittgenstein's entire psychology (in contradiction to the much-discussed criteriological approach, 92f.): According to Ter Hark, it is firstly about the "exclusion of the concept of opinion" since for Wittgenstein the attitude towards the so-called foreign psychology "is a matter of course" (ter Hark ib.) and he never took skepticism (towards other psychics) seriously (ib.).
Second, the attitude approach is not about a quasi-ideological connection between behavior and psychological states, but about the "decomposition" of the dichotomy between internal and external; this decomposition is "one of the main concerns of Wittgenstein's philosophy of language and psychology." (V. Savigny & Scholz 92) The "attitude to the soul", according to ter Hark, does not mean an attitude to the other "'and'to the soul'; it is not an attitude towards two things, but towards one thing "(93).

The most difficult core of Wittgenstein's conception of the psychic as well as of the activity of a meaningful psychology seems, according to recent interpreters, to be expressed in texts such as the following:

The quasi-Socratic, because rhetorical-ironic question "Not the behavior ..." does not yet solve the problem posed; it would only result: the psychologist observes the behavior of the people whose utterances are a part. Because the utterances do not act from Behavior, the sad look does not address the cause of mourning.
In a text variant, Wittgenstein makes it somewhat clearer that whoever describes a painting describes what the viewer sees - and not "the arrangement of the brushstrokes on the canvas" (7: 63/287).
But the problem can only be solved with the following text:

Please take a look at the simpler comparative example of the looming sky first. The answer to the question asked by Wittgenstein is simple: in the heavily cloudy sky we see that a thunderstorm is coming, we now see what will happen soon.
So the report "I noticed that he was upset" is both a report on behavior, here mimic-gestural and / or verbal behavior, and a report on a state of mind. But: it is not about two parallel events that the report reproduces, not about "side by side", but rather: one shows the other, one expresses the other, the two cannot be separated.
In his interpretation, Lütterfelds rightly speaks, as it seems to me, of a "mess model" (v. Savigny & Scholz, p. 113) and states: "The semantics of 'behavior' is ... just as little a mere physical-physical one Semantics like that of the state of the soul can only be internal-psychological. " (by Savigny & Scholz, p. 112)
If one also starts from Wittgenstein's semiotic concept of language, which integrates signs of all kinds, then we should speak of two language games not only on the psychological level of description, but already on the behavioral level, a behavioral language game and a mental language game, since every gesture already does can be a language game. "It is typical of the behavioral language game that it can only be played through the mental language game, while the opposite is characteristic of this." (Lütterfelds in v. Savigny & Scholz, p. 113)
An almost identical version of the text closes with the addition: "Isn't that mythology? No." (7: 64/288) Wittgenstein later evidently got over his scruples.
According to Wittgenstein, all of this also applies to the language game of psychology as an intersubjectively verifiable speech about language games. The fact that the psychologist speaks of psychological states by speaking of behavior is for ter Hark a "definition of the real subject of psychology", and it is "different from both introspection theory and behaviorism." (ter Hark in v. Savigny & Scholz, p. 103).
For Wittgenstein's semiotics of expression, there can be no private objects, or all disaster comes from the treatment of psychological and psychological phenomena according to the subject-object model of physics, which is expressed in descriptive sentences of the observer about objects, while - as in the text 571 the PU "the psychologist the Utterances (the behavior) of the subject observed. "
I doubt whether it is justified to call Wittgenstein's conception "a form of naive behaviorism", as ter Hark does (v. Savigny & Scholz, p. 106).

The title of my lecture quoted Wittgenstein's sentence in abbreviated form: "The human body is the best image of the human soul." (PU: 496)
One variant reads: "Man is the best image of the human soul." (7: 62/281)
In the context of my entire line of argument, I find the second (obviously earlier) formulation less clear or more abstract.
Nevertheless, I think that Wittgenstein's "body" version was not, so to speak, statically and materially about corporeality as such, but about the integral of the involuntary and arbitrary behavior of every human being. (But in my opinion Jochen Schulte is wrong when he claims in his book "Experience and Expression" (1987): "Wittgenstein basically does not take a position with regard to the body-soul problem." (1987: 154))

The human body is the best picture of the human soul insofar as the report "He was out of tune" given after looking at a certain face is not a metaphorical description of what has been seen. While metaphors can be paraphrased and translated into other sentences, and perhaps even reduced to other sentences, Wittgenstein is against translating or reducing psychological language to physical language, which in turn is the hallmark of logical behaviorism. According to Carnap, for example, every psychological sentence can be formulated in physical language ... "(ter Hark, v. Savigny & Scholz, p. 96f.) Wittgenstein formulated against Carnap:" There are many more language games than Carnap and others [sic] let yourself dream. "(BPP 1 920)

Finally, I must indicate a problem that - from a semiotic-philosophical point of view - is and remains the basic problem for the overall interpretation of Wittgenstein's philosophy, including the philosophy of psychology, in my opinion, namely the question: What is an "image" ? If one - like me - firmly adheres to the substantial unity of Wittgenstein's work, one cannot so easily move from the image theory of the Tractatus via the later genre image and portrait conception to a later, perhaps metaphorical, image concept .
What kind of "picture" does that mean is the "image" of the soul, which according to Wittgenstein is the human body?
For this I refer to the texts PU 422 and the following:
"What do I believe in when I believe in a soul in a person?" When I believe in something, "an image is in the foreground, but the meaning is far in the background; i.e. the application of the image cannot easily be overlooked." (PU 422)

Such a picture is clear and acceptable (cf. PU 423), Wittgenstein also does not want to dispute "its validity in a special case" (ib.): "Just let me now understand the application of the picture." (PU 423)
We are not astonished that Wittgenstein is essentially concerned with the application, the use (here of images); but one must take note of the relativization of images.
For the soul problem this means: the belief in a soul, which one can accept, even if one does not share it, gives us no "meaning" (PU 424), no meaning, not the function of this belief, which one rather in Must seek use of the image of the soul.

Wittgenstein, it now appears, PU 422 ff. Seems to be about the elaboration of two different pictorial forms:
Firstly, there are images that are imposing or that are simply there in everyday language (cf. PU: 496, 3), as linguistic forms. The following applies to these images: "The image is there. "(PU 424)
The problem with these given images is - as I said - the "application" because their "meaning" is unclear.
Wittgenstein differentiates between these images, which presumably include all metaphors, another form of image in which the application is not a problem, where "the application makes itself, as it were," and he refers to the "innumerable cases" in which we're trying to get a picture Find [Underline C.B.] "(PU 425).
In contrast, the (first-mentioned) given image is one that "imposes itself on us at every turn - but does not help us out of the difficulty that is only just beginning." (PU: 425)
And even more clearly: "An image is conjured up, that clearly seems to determine the meaning. The real use seems somewhat contaminated compared to what the picture shows us. "(PU 426)
Wittgenstein differentiates between images "in the foreground", images that are simply there, images that force themselves upon us at every step, images that are "conjured up" from images that we "try ... to find" (PU 425)
I now claim that the second image form is exactly that which corresponds to the epistemological image theory of the Tractatus: "We make images of the facts." (T 2.1)
The problem of "application" does not exist for these images that we produce, because with them "the application works by itself, as it were" (PU 425). This is exactly the SHOWING of the Tractatus in relation to the structural picture.
The image given (with the life form) would have to be distinguished from this, even if it is simply given in language, in everyday language. And with the given pictures the "application", the "sense" (PU 422) is the problem, although these pictures "clearly seem to determine the meaning "(PU 426).
My conclusion is: This is a late SUPPLEMENT to the image theory, by no means a task or an extension (the text PU 425 is completely unambiguous).

Now seems First of all, it must be clear that the image of the human body as an "image" of the human soul belongs to the given, not to the constructed images. Wittgenstein is not saying: We form an image of the soul that corresponds to the human body. That would be a nonsensical idea.
And the remark before is: "If the image of the thought in the head can impose itself on us, why not the image of the thought in the soul even more?"
The fact through which language The fact that pictures are traditionally made is also evident in the comment that follows. Here Wittgenstein says that one looks at the imposing images Not is aware "just to use a picture "." It is not a picture of our choice, not a simile, and yet a figurative expression. "(PU: 496)
With the term "allegory" Wittgenstein again refers to the image theory of the Tractatus, in which the fundamental "possibility of all similes, the entire imagery of our mode of expression" is worked out as "resting in the logic of illustration" (T 4.015).

So we have:
1. the image produced, which is a simile, with an ontological correspondence of language and reality, even with a "harmony ... of thought and reality" (PU 429) - confirmed by Wittgenstein in the PU.
The application of these images is self-evident because they show.
2. We have the imposing image that is simple there is, natural history (?) or culturally traditional-linguistic. This picture does not simply show, its meaning is in the background, it only shows itself in the application.
According to PU 430, the given image would NOT be a thought, it would be a dead sign, for which, as for all dead signs, applies:

"Words only have their meaning in the flow of life." (7: 468).
And: "Even what is going on inside has meaning only in the flow of life." (7: 468 fn.)

So the given pictures are all ready-made pictorial expressions of everyday language.
The conclusion must be:
With the proposition of the body as the best image of the human soul, it is important to be clear: it belongs neither to the linguistic images given nor to those produced; because the "body" is a real object, a physically present quantity, and not a sign.
That means: this sentence has a completely different dimension. And therefore one could doubt whether it was Wittgenstein himself (that is unclear) who placed him between the texts of Section IV of the so-called second part of the PU. (PU: 496)
Without addressing this problem, ter Hark concludes (in v. Savigny & Scholz, p. 93f) that Wittgenstein wants to say "that the soul is something visible." According to this, "the concept of the soul is linked to the perception of the human body" (94). And as proof, ter Hark quotes an unpublished remark (which follows PU 285 in the MS): "You can really say: the animated Body is in pain. And whether a body is animated can be perceived through the senses "(MS 124, p. 244f.).

Finally, we have to distinguish between:
1. Sentence images, punctuation marks, thoughts that we have produced (and which show, i.e. the correspondence between language and reality),
2. Images that are given to us through language (and which do not show, whose "meaning is in the background" (PU 422), so that their "application" causes difficulties. But they can provide a good "service" (PU: 495 , 4 and 498.1), like the psychological metaphors "grief in the soul", "thoughts in the heart" etc.
3. Objects, objects, living beings / people that have image character, expressive bodies are.

(The "image of the earth as a sphere", the Wittgenstein " good Picture "names and adds:" it is also a simple picture - in short, we work with it without doubting it. "(ÜG 147) - this picture is not of this third kind, but a combination of 1. and 2.)


If "postmodern" is what comes after modernity, then - that is my view - that which psycho-philosophically came to Wittgenstein and still comes and goes, lags behind what he thought "modern".

In 1992 the radical constructivist Heinz von Foerster tried two short formulas for epistemological realism and constructivism. For realism he gives the formula: "The world is the cause, experience is the result."
For constructivism the formula: "Experience is the cause, the world is the result."
(Lischka 1993: 46)
If one simplifies these positions by way of explanation, one would say about realism, especially also the empirical one of Russell: Because the world exists factually and sovereignly, it can and must at some point come about that people perceive the real world.
To constructivism one could say: The starting point for man is in any case the perceiving-constructing man himself. He has to construct a world for himself in order to be able to live.

For Wittgenstein it is presumably true that he stands beyond realism as well as beyond constructivism, in that his position should be characterized as constructivist-realistic. That still has to be shown.
Now, as is well known, radical constructivism is a naturalized epistemology, and one could say: philosophically, the inaccessibility of the physical world has another meaning, namely - none.

Hanns Wienold says at the end of his review of the anthology "Wittgenstein über die Seele" (in the Psychological literature review 1/1996: 25), psychology must "put up with the question of its 'attitude towards the soul'." (25): "While sociology tried, at least for a time, to integrate Wittgenstein's philosophy of language into its program ..., psychology seems to have gone straight from ignoring to forgetting."
Maybe it doesn't have to stay that way.





Wittgenstein, L .: Work edition in 8 volumes. Frankfurt am Main [1984] (Abbreviation: 1 = Volume 1 etc. Example: "7: 134" = Volume 7, page 134)

Wittgenstein, L .: Vienna edition. (Ed. M. Nedo) Vienna [1994 ff.] (Abbr .: WA 1, WA 2 etc.)

Wittgenstein, L .: letters. Frankfurt am Main 1980 (Abbreviation: Br)

Wittgenstein, L .: Lecture on ethics. Frankfurt am Main [1989] (Abbreviation: VE)

Wittgenstein, L .: Mixed remarks. A selection from the estate. (Ed. G.H. von Wright et al.) Frankfurt am Main [1994] (Abbreviation: VB)

Wittgenstein, L .: Estate manuscripts in the Wittgenstein Archive in Cambridge, Wren Library (Trinity College)

Wittgenstein, L .: Lectures 1930–1935. (Ed. Lee, D./A. Ambrose) Frankfurt am Main [1984] (Abbreviation: Lectures)

Wittgenstein, L: Lecture on ethics and other small writings. (Ed. J. Schulte) [1989]: Frankfurt am Main (Abbreviation: VE)

Wittgenstein, L: Lectures on the philosophy of psychology 1946/47. (Ed. By P.T. Geach) [1991] Frankfurt am Main (Abbreviation: VPP)

Wittgenstein, L .: Mixed remarks. A selection from the estate. (Ed. G.H. von Wright) Frankfurt am Main [1994] (Abbreviation: VB)

Abbreviations for individual works:

BPP = "Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology (in Volume 7 of the work edition)

PU = "Philosophical Investigations" (in Volume 1 of the work edition. "PU 125" = Text 125; "PU: 467" = Page 467)

VB = "Mixed Remarks" VE = "Lecture on Ethics" (in J. Schulte (Ed.) 1989)

Z = "note" (in volume 8 of the work edition)

Secondary literature

Bezzel, C. (1988). Wittgenstein for an introduction. Hamburg: Junius (4th edition in preparation)

Bezzel, C .: The Art of Philosophizing and Philosophy of Art. In: Wittgenstein. Biography, philosophy, practice. Exhibition by the Vienna Secession, Vienna, September 13-29, 1989, pp. 275-311

Bezzel, C. (1990). Image, phrase, text. Wittgenstein and the (new) poetry. In: Schmidt-Dengler et al. Pp. 69 - 87

Bezzel, C. (1992). Perception game and language game. A sketch. In: Semiotic

Reports, 1, 2, Vienna

Bezzel, C. (1992). Wittgenstein as a semiotic. In: Kodikas, Vol. 15

Bezzel, C. (1996). Perception, language, time. On the philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein. In: Kodikas, Vol.19

Bezzel, C. (1999). Face space. On Wittgenstein's theory of perception. In: Kodikas, Vol. 22

Bezzel, C. (1999). "One should actually only write philosophy." About Ludwig Wittgenstein. In: R. Faber / B. Naumann (eds.) 1999: Literary philosophy / philosophical literature. Wurzburg

Bezzel, C. (1999). Change of aspect. Art according to Wittgenstein. In: E. List / M. Strauss (ed.): Form in contemporary art

Brother, K.-J. (1993). Subjectivity and postmodernism. The discourse of psychology. Frankfurt am Main

Giegel, Hans Joachim (1969). The logic of mental events. On the theories of L. Wittgenstein and W. Sellars. Frankfurt am Main

Haller, R. (1990): How not to philosophize with a hammer. In: Schmidt-Dengler, W. et al.

Kambartel, F. (1991). Try to understand. In: McGuiness et al.

Lischka, G. J. (Ed.) (1993). The unleashed look. Symposium, workshops, exhibition. Bern.

McGuinness, B. et al. (1991). "The lion is speaking ... and we cannot understand him." Frankfurt am Main

Roberts, J. (1992). The calculating subject. Philosophy of mind and mathematical foundations in WittgensteinsTractatus. In: Vossenkuhl, pp. 53 - 77

Rust, Alois (1996). Wittgenstein's philosophy of psychology. Frankfurt am Main

Savigny, E. von & O.R. Scholz (ed.) (1995) Wittgenstein on the soul. Frankfurt am Main

Schmidt-Dengler, W. & M. Huber & M. Huter (eds.) (1990) Wittgenstein and philosophy / literature. Vienna

Vossenkuhl, W. (Ed.) (1992). Learn from Wittgenstein. Berlin